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INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS BY AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES
ABSTRACT
The American Indian tribes have a unique status in the law of the United States.  They 
are characterized as ‘sovereigns’ that predate the formation of the republic and possess 
inherent powers and immunities.  Their powers permit them to create and enforce laws 
and generally to operate as autonomous governmental entities with executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches.  They enjoy immunity from suit and exemption from 
federal and state constitutional provisions which protect individual rights.  These 
powers and immunities provide a connection between tribal governments and US 
international human rights obligations.  This essay explores this connection.  It 
examines whether the tribes may breach the international human rights obligations of 
the US, whether the tribal violations may incur US international responsibility, and if 
so, what consequences might result.  It constructs an argument that the US has failed to 
implement fully its international human rights obligations and that it can be held 
internationally responsible for tribal violations of human rights.  This argument leads to 
policy recommendations for the US and tribal governments.
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A INTRODUCTION
Recent work on international human rights and indigenous peoples focuses on the 
promotion and protection of ‘self-determination’, and on the development of group 
rights.  International human rights tribunals have decided cases dealing with the rights 
of indigenous peoples while individual members of indigenous groups have 
successfully challenged State violations of international human rights.1  The study of 
indigenous peoples and international law has thus been limited to the development of 
indigenous groups’ rights against the State.  This narrow approach to the overlap 
between international human rights law, municipal law, and indigenous rights, neglects 
potential consequences of individual human rights violations by indigenous groups.  
The indigenous peoples of the United States (US), the American Indian tribes, 
have legislative authority, executive departments, police, and prisons.  In fact, they 
resemble sub-State units of government, and exercise extensive governmental authority.  
This governmental status raises several questions about the potential for tribal entities to 
violate individual rights.  Can the tribes exercise their governmental powers in a manner 
which violates an individual’s human rights?  Has the US implemented human rights 
protections against the tribes? Can tribal conduct constitute a breach of international 
human rights obligations binding on the US and, if so, what are the consequences?  Is 
tribal conduct attributable to the US under international law?  This essay explores these 
1
 eg Mary and Carrie Dann (US) (Merits) IACHR Case 11.140 (2002) Report no 75/02 [96]-[98]; 
Lovelace v Canada HRC Communication no R 6/24 UN Doc Supp 40 (A/36/40) 166 (1981); Kitok v 
Sweden (Merits) HRC UN Doc CCPR/C/33/D/197/85 [9.8].
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issues and endeavours to answer the question whether the US may incur international 
responsibility for human rights violations committed by American Indian tribes.  
B STATUS OF AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES IN MUNICIPAL LAW
American Indian tribes, as acknowledged in the US Constitution of 1789, are distinct 
political communities possessing attributes of self-government and legal systems 
separate from the national (‘federal’) or state governments.2  The term ‘government’ in 
this study does not refer only to an executive.  Rather it is used to connote the entire 
body of political institutions available to a political community, whether the US, its 
states, or the Indian tribes.  Thus, ‘tribal government’ refers to the tribal legislative, 
executive, administrative, and judicial bodies established under the particular tribal 
constitution.  Tribal governments vary in size and complexity, and assert authority over 
a wide range of people and territory.  Certain California rancherias comprise only a few 
families and acres of land, while a large tribe, such as the Navajo Nation operates as a 
complex political community whose population approximates Iceland’s and whose 
territorial extent rivals that of the Republic of Ireland.  
Citizens of tribes are ‘members’, and most tribes have exclusive authority to 
define their membership or ‘enrolment’.  Membership in a tribal polity is a political, not 
a racial or ethnic, classification.  Although the tribes comprise mainly indigenous 
individuals descended from pre-Columbian inhabitants of North America, tribes are not 
2
 F Cohen Handbook of Federal Indian Law (Michie Charlottesville 1988) 232-34; Worcester v Georgia
31 US (6 Pet) 515, 8 L Ed 483 (1832) 559, 500. 
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necessarily ethnically homogenous.  They have been voluntarily and forcibly integrated 
with others, and several tribes historically naturalized non-indigenous peoples, such as 
escaped or freed African slaves.  In addition to tribal membership, American Indians 
born in US territory hold both US citizenship and citizenship of the US state in which 
they reside.3  Certain tribes whose territory has been severed by the US-Mexican or US-
Canadian national borders enrol members from the non-US side of the boundary 
making it possible for tribal members to be foreign nationals.
US municipal law conceptualises tribal governments as one of three ‘sovereign’ 
institutions, the others being the federal and state governments.  The federal constitution 
split the atom of sovereignty between state and national governments, but its 
demarcation of governmental powers and individual rights does not bind the tribes, 
which municipal law regards as pre-existing entities outside the federal framework.4  In 
some respects municipal law categorizes tribes as entities analogous to foreign States 
rather than as regional sub-State entities.  Notably, until 1871 the federal government 
dealt with the tribes through treaties which US courts continue to classify as equivalent 
to international treaties in municipal law.5
Each tribe’s governmental powers vary depending on its unique treaty history 
and applicable acts of Congress.  To encompass this diversity, this paper generalizes 
3
 (2000) 8 USC s 1401(b) (naturalizes Indians born in US territory); US Const amd XIV (1868) (US state 
citizenship derivative of national citizenship).
4 Talton v Mayes 163 US 376, 16 S Ct 986 (1896) 382-84, 988-90; US v Wheeler 435 US 313, 98 S Ct 
1079 (1978). 
5 Cheung v US 213 F 3d 82, 89-90 (9th Cir 2000).
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tribal authority.6  However, two types of American Indian tribes must be distinguished: 
those recognized by the federal government and those without such recognition.  
Federal recognition weaves tribes into the fabric of US constitutional law.  Broadly 
speaking, recognized tribes enjoy the powers and immunities of a sovereign government 
under municipal law.  Unrecognized tribes may possess treaty rights (such as hunting or 
fishing rights) against the US, but municipal law regards them as private collective 
associations or clubs rather than as governments with legislative or enforcement 
jurisdiction.  
In the US Supreme Court’s (USSC) foundational Indian-law trilogy,7 Chief Justice 
Marshall articulated a view of tribes as distinct independent political communities with 
exclusive authority in their territories derived from their original ‘tribal sovereignty’.  
Nonetheless, the Court found that the tribes’ comparative weakness and dependence 
upon the US required divestiture of external sovereignty: specifically the tribes’ rights 
to treat with foreign States and to cede lands to any entity other than the federal 
government.  Though the Court disagreed with tribal claims to full independence, the 
tribes retained internal aspects of sovereignty to govern themselves and others within 
their territory.  Still today municipal law characterizes tribal powers as derivative of 
their status as ‘sovereign’ entities predating formation of the republic.  Their legislative 
6
 Alaskan and Hawaiian Natives fall outside this description as do tribes whose adjudicative jurisdiction 
has been compromised by Public Law 280, which extends state jurisdiction to tribal matters.
7 Johnson v McIntosh 21 US (8 Wheat) 543, 5 L Ed 681 (1823) (doctrine of discovery gives ‘discovering’ 
European State the sole right to acquire tribal territory through ‘purchase or conquest’); Cherokee Nation 
v Georgia 30 US (5 Pet) 1, 8 L Ed 25 (1831) (treaties demonstrate tribe is a ‘state’, a ‘distinct political 
society separated from others capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself’, but not a foreign 
state); Worcester (n 2) (US is tribal ‘protector’ in an unequal alliance; the tribes retain all internal 
attributes of sovereignty).
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and enforcement jurisdiction is inherent; it does not depend upon federal delegation,
though the federal government may delegate additional authority to the tribes.8
Following the judicial deprivation of external sovereignty, Congress and the 
Courts have steadily eroded tribal powers so that tribes now enjoy a significantly 
smaller sphere of legislative and enforcement jurisdiction than they did in the 1830s.  
The federal common law doctrine of Congressional ‘plenary power’ over tribes9 permits 
Congress to eliminate or reduce tribal powers.  The doctrine extends to the point of 
termination of the US-tribal relationship (changing a tribe’s status from recognized to 
unrecognized), although certain tribal powers or immunities may survive this 
termination.  Federal courts also assert authority to divest tribal powers pursuant to a 
common-law doctrine that the tribes occupy a dependent position in the hierarchy of 
American ‘sovereigns’: federal courts may thus refuse to recognize tribal powers 
inconsistent with their status as dependents of the federal government.10
Because federal common law conceptualises tribes as a sort of sovereign, its 
‘sovereign immunity’ doctrine extends to them.  This immunity shields the tribe, tribal 
agencies, and tribal officials acting in an official capacity, against lawsuits challenging 
governmental or commercial acts in federal, state, or tribal courts.  It is the same 
doctrine that shields foreign States, the federal government, and US state governments 
from suit.  However, in practice tribal immunity is more extensive than that accorded to 
other governments, because statutory and judicial limitations restricting immunity do 
8 US v Lara 541 US 193, 124 S Ct 1628 (2004).
9 Talton (n 4) 384.
10 Merrion v Jicarilla Apache Tribe 455 US 130, 102 S Ct 894 (1982) 149, 908.
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not generally apply to the tribes.  For instance, although the federal and state 
governments statutorily waive immunity against tort claims, enabling individuals 
injured by governmental officials to seek compensation, many tribes have not done so.11
Tribes retain legislative and enforcement jurisdiction over their internal affairs.  
This jurisdiction includes the power to define their polity, to exclude individuals from 
their lands, to make and enforce criminal and civil laws, to levy taxes, to regulate 
marriage, and to decide whether to develop natural resources within their territories.  
Tribal law enforcement officers have authority to stop and investigate non-Indians on 
tribal lands for violations of state or federal law, and may detain and transport alleged 
offenders to the authorities with adjudicative jurisdiction.12  More fundamentally, the 
tribes organize their own governmental and political institutions.  Most model their 
governments on the US and create formal branches with partial separation of powers.  
Others have retained traditional forms of government and customary legal systems.  
Pueblos in Arizona and New Mexico, for example, retain traditional governments based 
on unwritten customary law, without a formal court structure, while the Navajo Nation 
operates a complex appellate court system, and has an exhaustive tribal code, but no 
written constitution.    
Whether a tribal court possesses adjudicative jurisdiction over a matter often 
depends upon the nature of the claim, the identity of the claimant or defendant, and 
where the claim arose.  Jurisdiction might lie exclusively in tribal court, might be shared 
11 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v Manufacturing Technologies, Inc 523 US 751, 118 S Ct 1700 (1998); Sac 
and Fox Nation v Hanson 47 F 3d 1061 (10th Cir 1995) 1064-65 cert denied 516 US 810 (1995); US 
Commission on Civil Rights The Indian Civil Rights Act: A Report of the US Commission on Civil Rights
(US Washington DC 1991) 63-67.
12 Duro v Reina 495 US 676, 110 S Ct 2053 (1991) 697, 2056-57.
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with a federal court, or might lie exclusively in a federal court.  Where concurrent 
jurisdiction exists claimants must exhaust tribal remedies before pursuing a claim in the 
federal system.  Tribal courts retain inherent criminal jurisdiction over Indians, but their 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians has been judicially abrogated13 (though at least 
one tribal court has found this decision did not affect its inherent criminal jurisdiction 
over foreign nationals).14
C TRIBAL VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS BINDING ON THE UNITED STATES
1 International Human Rights Obligations
Several human rights instruments bind the US under international law.  Those 
susceptible to tribal violations include the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),15 the International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (ICAT),16 and the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).17  Inter-American 
jurisprudence demonstrates that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
13 Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe 435 US 191, 98 S Ct 1011 (1978).
14 Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v Chavez (E Cherokee Ct 2004) Docket no CR-03-1039.
15
 (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 99 UNTS 171.
16
 (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85.
17
 (adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195.
International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by American Indian Tribes 8
Man (American Declaration)18 binds the US.19  Potential also exists for tribal law 
enforcement officials to breach article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (VCCR).20  The US must adopt such laws or other measures as may be 
required to give effect to the substantive rights recognized in these documents. 
2 US Implementation of its Human Rights Obligations
When the Senate ratifies an international human rights convention, it typically enters 
reservations, declarations, and understandings, which attempt to restrict US 
international obligations to the extent they differ from US municipal law.  Thus, US law 
automatically reflects its international undertakings and no statutory implementation is 
necessary.  The ICCPR, CERD, and ICAT bind the US internationally, but domestically 
the self-execution doctrine prevents judicial enforcement of the treaty provisions.21  If 
the Senate declares a treaty non-self-executing, as it has done for each of the human 
rights conventions, the treaty provisions create no private cause of action and can only 
18
 OAS GA Res XXX (adopted by the 9th International Conference of the American States) (1948) 
reprinted in ‘Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System’ 
OEA/Ser/L/V/II.82 Doc 6 Rev 1 (1992) 17.
19 Baby Boy Case (US) IACHR Case 2141 Resolution no 23/81 (1981) [13]-[17]; Roach and Pinkerton 
(US) Case 9647 Report no 3/87 (1987) [46]-[49]; Interpretation of the American Declaration within the 
Framework of the ACHR (Advisory Opinion OC-10/89) IACtHR Series A no 10 (1989) [35]-[45] (‘the 
American Declaration is for [OAS member States] a source of international obligations related to the 
Charter…’); Haitian Interdiction (US) (Merits) Case 10.675 Report no 51/96 (1997) n 35.  
20
 (adopted 24 April 1963, entered into force 19 March 1967) 596 UNTS 261.
21 US v Postal 589 F2d 862, 875-77 (5th Cir 1972) cert denied 444 US 832 (1979).
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be enforced when implemented through federal legislation.22  The US believes its 
commitment to comply with these conventions requires no implementing legislation 
because pre-existing federal, state, and local laws provide sufficient protection to 
individuals.  A legal advisor to the State Department testified before a Senate hearing 
on whether to ratify CERD, that: 
As was the case with the earlier [human rights] treaties, existing US law 
provides extensive protection and remedies.… There is thus no need for the 
establishment of additional causes of action to enforce the requirements of the 
convention.23
While this may be true in respect of federal and state governments, it is not true in 
respect of tribal governments.  
Most individual rights provisions which bind the US find expression in the US 
Bill of Rights—the first ten amendments to the Constitution—and the 14th Amendment.  
These protections bind federal and state governments,24 and are enforceable by 
individuals in federal and state courts.  Judicial decisions and federal civil rights 
legislation have created remedies for their violation by government officers.  Yet, the 
constitutional amendments and enforcement mechanisms are inapplicable to tribal 
governments, rendering municipal law not fully reflective of US international human 
22
 D Weissbrodt J Fitzpatrick and F Newman International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Progress (3rd
edn Anderson Cincinnati 2001) 687-89; Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the US (1987) s 
131 comment h [58].
23 Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Conrad Harper, Legal Advisor to the State 
Department (11 May 1994) 5 Dispatch Magazine 22; Weissbrodt (n 28) 689.
24
 The due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution incorporates most Bill of Rights 
provisions against the states.  The due process clause of the 5th Amendment incorporates the equal 
protection clause against the federal government.
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rights obligations.  This implementation failure creates substantive gaps in the map of 
US human rights law.   
Congress’s one attempt to implement human rights protections against the 
tribes, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA),25 contains provisions analogous to 
those found in the US Bill of Rights, and provides the only protection (apart from tribal 
law) for Indians and non-Indians alike against tribal human rights violations.  Though it
became law before US accession to any human rights conventions, ICRA reflects 
several convention provisions.  But it does not reflect them all, and this is important.    
A juxtaposition of ICRA and the international human rights conventions reveals 
substantive discrepancies.  For example, article 14 of the ICCPR requires that indigent 
criminal defendants be provided legal assistance ‘in any case where the interests of 
justice so require’.26  The HRC has held that States must provide legal assistance at all
stages of criminal proceedings.27  The US achieves implementation of this provision 
through the Constitution’s due process clauses, which require the states and federal 
government to provide defence counsel to indigent criminal defendants facing 
confinement,28 and declares its municipal law sufficient implementation of the ICCPR.  
[T]he United States understands that [article 14(3)] do[es] not require the 
provision of a criminal defendant's counsel of choice when the defendant is 
provided with court-appointed counsel on grounds of indigence, when the 
25
 (2000) 25 USC ss 1301-1341.
26
 ICCPR (n 15) art 14(3)(d).
27 Borisenko v Hungary HRC UN Doc CCPR/C/76/D/852/1999 (2002) [7.5].
28 Argersinger v Hamelin 407 US 25, 92 S Ct 2006 (1972); Tom v Sutton 533 F 2d 1101 (9th Cir 1976). 
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defendant is financially able to retain alternative counsel, or when imprisonment 
is not imposed.29
ICRA, however, fails to achieve implementation against tribal governments, because it 
does not require them to provide legal assistance under any circumstances; tribes can 
prosecute and sentence destitute defendants to one year’s imprisonment and a $5,000 
fine without providing legal assistance of any kind.30  The tribes may choose to provide 
legal assistance, but federal law does not so require.  Other substantive gaps between 
ICRA and US international obligations include the absence of a right to vote, a right to 
participate in government, a right to review by a higher tribunal, and a right to privacy.  
Domestic acceptance of tribal-federal criminal prosecutions may be another gap 
in implementation.  The USSC case US v Lara illustrates how dual tribal-federal 
prosecutions come about.  In Lara, a non-member Indian assaulted a federal officer 
during an arrest for violation of a tribal exclusion order.31  The defendant pleaded guilty 
to the tribal crime of ‘violence against a policeman’ and served ninety days in prison.  
The federal government subsequently prosecuted him for assaulting a federal official.  
Because key elements of the tribal and federal crimes were identical the second 
prosecution would normally be quashed.  However, the Court found the offences 
distinct crimes against separate ‘sovereigns’ and upheld the federal conviction.  Article 
14(7) ICCPR provides that ‘[n]o one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an 
29
 US ‘Reservations, declarations and understandings, ICCPR’ 138 Cong Rec S4781-01 (daily edn 2 April 
1992) understanding 4.  The HRC also views failure to provide competent counsel to indigent criminal 
defendants violative of the provision.  HRC ‘Concluding Observations: US’ (1995) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/79/Add.50 [288].
30
 ICRA (n 25) s 1302(7). Should a tribe exceed these penalties, the defendant may challenge its 
jurisdiction in federal court.  
31 Lara (n 8).
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offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted…’.  Municipal law 
treats parallel prosecutions by the state, tribal, and federal governments as offences 
against separate ‘sovereigns’ not barred by the US Constitution’s double jeopardy 
clause.  The US reservation to article 14(7) restricts its application to existing municipal 
law as to the federal government and its ‘constituent units’.  Since the tribes are not 
constituent units of the federal system, dual tribal-federal prosecutions for the same 
offence breach criminal defendants’ article 14(7) rights.  
Even when an ICRA provision reproduces verbatim a constitutional right, which 
reflects an international human right provision, tribal interests can justify conflicting 
treatment of ICRA provisions and their constitutional predecessors.32  Courts have 
‘correctly sensed that Congress did not intend … [constitutional principles to] disrupt 
settled tribal customs’.33 Essentially, although ICRA protections implement against 
tribes constitutional substantive rights, the precise meaning of these guarantees will be 
different for tribal governments than for governments bound by the substantive 
constitutional provisions.  ICRA provisions may thereby develop meanings unreflective 
of US international human rights obligations even where the ICRA provisions 
superficially correspond to US constitutional rights implementing such obligations 
against state and federal governments.
Municipal practice might fail sufficiently to reflect US international obligations 
even where a treaty is self-executing.  For instance, the US consistently fails to enforce 
32 Wounded Head v Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe 507 F 2d 1079 (8th Cir 1975) 1082-83; Randall 
v Yakima Nation Tribal Court 841 F 2d 897 (9th Cir 1988) 900.
33 Cohen (n 2) 670. 
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its consular relations obligations against US states, and consequently has been haled 
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) several times for state violations of article 
36 VCCR, which requires that arrested foreign nationals be notified of their right to 
communicate with their consulate and that the consulate be notified upon detainment of 
a national.  Whilst federalism concerns have prevented domestic enforcement of the 
VCCR against US states, potential tribal violations remain unexamined.  
This point is contentious because federal Indian law scholars assert that the 
USSC eliminated tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in Oliphant v Suquamish 
Indian Tribe.34  This appears to prevent tribes from breaching article 36 VCCR.35  Yet, 
there are four areas in which tribes have authority to assert law enforcement jurisdiction 
over foreign nationals.  First, the membership of some border tribes includes Mexican 
or Canadian foreign nationals.36  US municipal law identifies members of recognized 
tribes as Indians and thus subjects these foreign nationals to tribal criminal jurisdiction.  
Secondly, though the Court in Oliphant spoke of ‘non-Indians’ its reasoning applies 
only to US citizen non-Indians.  The tribal court in Eastern Cherokee Band of Indians v 
Chavez exposed this flaw, and found that it retains inherent criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indian aliens.37  Thirdly, tribal power to exclude individuals from tribal lands 
34 Oliphant (n 13) (non-Indians should not be subject to alien courts’ criminal jurisdiction).
35
 J Kalt and J Singer ‘Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The Law and Economics of Indian Self-
Rule’ (2004) Harvard Faculty Research Working Paper no RWP04-016 30 (‘tribes have no criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians whatsoever’).
36
 Approximately 8,400 Tohono O’odham members are Mexican nationals.  C Duarte ‘Tohono O’odham: 
Campaign for Citizenship, Nation Divided’ (31 May 2001) Arizona Daily Star.  
37 Chavez (n 14).
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includes a power to detain and remove.38  Finally, tribal courts potentially retain 
criminal contempt power over non-Indians.39  These points illustrate the potential for 
tribal breaches of US consular relations obligations.  Congressional plenary power over 
the tribes frees the US from the federalism concerns evident in LaGrand,40 and permits 
Congress to implement VCCR provisions against them.
3 Tribal Human Rights Violations
The USSC case, Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez,41 provides a clear illustration of tribal 
governments’ capacity to breach international human rights obligations of the US.  
Despite arising prior to US accession to the international human rights covenants, a 
similar case could arise today.  In fact, the tribal law which gave rise to the litigation is 
still in force.42  The factually analogous Human Rights Committee (HRC) decision, 
Lovelace v Canada,43 can be used to test the assertion that the law at issue in Martinez, 
or similar tribal laws, breach ICCPR provisions.  
The facts giving rise to the Martinez case were as follows.  Julia Martinez, a 
full-blood member of the Santa Clara Pueblo, married a full-blood member of the 
38 Linneen v Gila River Indian Community, 276 F3d 489 (9th Cir 2002) cert denied (2002) 536 US 939.
39
 W Canby American Indian Law in a Nutshell (4th edn West St Paul 2004 ) 177.
40 LaGrand Case (Germany v US) (Merits) [2001] ICJ Rep 466.
41
 436 US 49, 98 S Ct 1670 (1978).
42
 B Berger ‘Indian Policy and the Imagined Indian Woman’ (2004) 14 KJLPP 103.
43 Lovelace (n 1).
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Navajo Nation in 1941.  The couple had children and raised them on the Pueblo as tribal 
members.  The children were included in the cultural and spiritual life of the tribe and 
spoke the Santa Claran language, Tewa, fluently.  Despite their clear genetic and 
cultural affinity with the Pueblo, the Pueblo government denied the children tribal 
membership on the basis of a tribal law which forbade children of Santa Claran mothers 
and non-Santa Claran fathers to gain membership.  The law conversely permitted 
children of Santa Claran fathers and non-Santa Claran mothers to become tribal 
members.  
Because their father was a non-member, the Martinez children could not acquire 
citizenship in the political community with which they most closely identified.  The 
Pueblo asserted that the law represented its patriarchal cultural heritage, and did not 
contest its discriminatory nature.  A similar federal or state law would be struck down 
as a violation of equal protection,44 but since the tribes are not constituent entities of the 
federation tribal laws cannot violate such constitutional protections.  The Pueblo 
membership law discriminates on the basis of gender and violates several international 
human rights provisions which bind the US. It therefore breaches US international 
obligations, and, if attributable to the US, entails US international responsibility.  
The discriminatory Pueblo statute violates the non-discrimination, equal 
protection, and effective remedy provisions of the ICCPR and American Declaration.  
The tribal gender discrimination gives rise to additional violations of individual rights 
guaranteed by the ICCPR, most prominently the denial to her children of the individual 
44 Caban v Mohammed, 441 US 380, 99 S Ct 1760 (1979) (invalidating a state law which discriminated 
between parental rights based on gender of the parent).
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right to partake in minority culture (article 27) and the right to take part in government 
(article 25).  The Martinez children lost all benefits of tribal membership and faced 
several hardships.  When their mother died, they could not inherit her property, use 
tribal property, or remain on tribal lands.  As non-members they were ineligible to 
participate in tribal government and could be excluded from access to their culture, 
language, and religion.  Martinez sued the Pueblo and Pueblo Governor in federal court 
to overturn the discriminatory statute as a violation of the ICRA equal protection 
clause.45  The USSC found that ICRA did not abrogate tribal immunity and created no 
federal cause of action.  Although the Court explained that the tribal court is the 
appropriate forum, a tribal court will not entertain a suit against the tribe, or a tribal 
official, unless tribal sovereign immunity has been waived, whether by common law or 
by statute.  ICRA thus becomes an illusory implementation of US international human 
rights obligations.46
Lovelace v Canada,47 involved a law very similar to the Pueblo law at issue in 
Martinez and demonstrates that the tribal law violates the human rights of Santa Clara 
women and children.  Lovelace, a Maliseet Indian in Canada, lost her tribal membership 
upon her 1970 marriage to a non-Indian.  The Indian Act, a Canadian federal law, 
terminated the tribal membership of Indian women who marry non-Indians, but 
permitted male Indians who intermarry to retain membership.  It also made Lovelace’s 
45 Martinez (n 41) 54-55; 1675.
46 Dubray v Rosebud Housing Authority 12 ILR 6015 (Rosebud Sioux Tribal Ct 1985) (federal court had 
dismissed claim on basis that tribal court was appropriate forum; tribal court dismissed finding no waiver 
of tribal immunity).  
47 Lovelace (n 1).
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children ineligible for membership.  The HRC recognized that the Indian Act ‘entails 
serious disadvantages on the part of the Indian woman who wants to marry a non-Indian 
man’.48  These disadvantages were similar to those found in Martinez, and included loss 
of the right to reside or possess lands within the reserve, to inherit possessory interests 
in reserve land, or to be buried on tribal land.  Loss of status also resulted in a loss of 
the right to exercise Indian hunting and fishing rights, and to partake in tribal culture 
and religion.  The intertemporal principle prevented the HRC from finding Canada 
responsible for a breach of the ICCPR non-discrimination provisions, because the 
Convention did not enter into force against Canada until six years after the marriage.49
However, it found Lovelace’s continuing loss of cultural benefits breached article 27’s 
right of minorities to participate in culture, language, and religion in community with 
other group members.  Canada has since revised the Indian Act to eliminate gender 
discrimination and to permit children of women who intermarry to retain tribal 
membership, but the HRC has expressed concern over continuing exclusion of 
subsequent generations.50
Whereas Canada enacted the discriminatory Act at issue in Lovelace, the 
analogous law at issue in Martinez was a tribal ordinance.  Each law deprived minority 
individuals their right to partake in culture and religion.  They also had significant 
effects on property rights and rights of participation in the tribal political community.  
Lovelace substantiates the contention that the Pueblo ordinance violates ICCPR 
48
 ibid [7.2].
49
 ibid [10]-[12].
50
 HRC ‘Concluding Observations: Canada’ (1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.105.
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provisions which bind the US under international law.  The HRC statement that the 
right of access to minority culture protects those ‘brought up on a reserve, who have 
kept ties with their community and wish to maintain those ties’ would surely encompass 
the Martinez children.  These cases demonstrate that the American Indian tribes, 
through exercise of their governmental powers, are capable of conduct violative of US 
international human rights obligations.  
A fascinating possibility exists that the traditional tribal punishment of 
banishment breaches international human rights norms binding on the US, such as 
ICCPR’s article 27 individual rights of access to minority culture or even CERD’s 
provisions on participation in government.  Banishment involves expulsion of a member 
and deprivation of his or her rights to vote, to participate in tribal government, to take 
part in the tribe’s religious and cultural life, to inherent property, and to use tribal lands.  
Banished members have alleged that their tribe imposed the punishment for improper 
reasons, such as their race or political views.51  In Poodry v Tonawanda Band of Seneca 
Indians,52 claimants alleged that the tribe convicted them in absentia for treason 
(conspiracy to overthrow the tribal government) and banished them.  Although the
Poodry court indicated in obiter dicta that ICRA implicitly proscribes banishment, no 
other cases support this view.  The HRC has defined minority membership as 
‘objective’, and it has been suggested that article 27 not only prevents States from 
51 Seminole Nation of Oklahoma v Norton 223 F Supp 2d 122 (DC Dist 2002).
52 Poodry v Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians 85 F 3d 874 (2nd Cir 1996) 884, 898.
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defining minority group membership, but also prevents minority groups from 
conclusively defining their own membership.53
Limited federal review of ICRA violations and tribal sovereign immunity 
prevent abundant litigation of tribal human rights violations.  Nonetheless, several 
examples of tribal conduct in breach of US international obligations can be gleaned 
from federal and tribal case reports.  Tribes have prevented members of African descent 
from voting or participating in government based on their race in violation of CERD’s 
prohibition on racial discrimination in the context of civil and political rights.54
Traditional Pueblos have attempted to limit members’ religious freedom.55  Claimants 
have alleged free speech violations, arbitrary detention and seizure of property, and 
conduct arguably within the definition of cruel or degrading treatment.56  Conditions in 
tribal prisons are routinely cited as among the worst in the US.57  The HRC has 
commented on conditions in US prisons but has not specifically considered tribal 
53
 S Joseph, J Schultz and M Castan International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, 
Materials, and Commentary (2d ed OUP Oxford 2004) [24.10]-[24.11]; HRC ‘General Comment 23: The 
Rights of Minorities (Article 27)’ UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add5 (1994) [5.2]; Lovelace (n 49); Kitok 
(n 1) [9.8] (Sami decision to deny membership, for purposes of a national law which entailed herding 
rights, to an individual already permitted to herd did not constitute an article 27 ICCPR breach). 
54 Nero v Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma 892 F 2d 1457, 1463 (10th Cir 1989); Norton (n 50); Davis v US
343 F 3d 1282 (10th Cir 2003) cert denied 124 S Ct 2907 (2004); CERD (n 17) art 5.
55
 F Svensson ‘Liberal Democracy and Group Rights; The Legacy of Individualism and its Impact on 
American Indian Tribes’ (1979) 27 Political Studies 3.
56 Choctaws for Democracy v Choctaw Council 5 Okla Trib 165 (Choctaw Tribal Ct 1996); Rorex v 
Cherokee Nation 6 Okla Trib 239 (Cherokee JAT 1995); Kennedy v Hughes 60 Fed Appx 734 (10th Cir 
2003) (unreported); Linneen (n 38).
57
 US Department of Justice Jails in Indian Country, 2002 (Bureau of Justice Statistics Washington DC 
2003).
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detention facilities.58  The tribes are in a special position to breach certain civil and 
political rights of their members, but official actions like arbitrary detention or wrongful 
seizure of property can be perpetrated against Indians, non-Indians, and foreign 
nationals alike.  These cases illustrate the lacuna between US international human rights 
obligations and municipal implementation against tribal governments.   
D DOMESTIC REMEDIES FOR TRIBAL VIOLATIONS
1 Access to Courts
Whereas the few substantive gaps in implementation of international obligations against 
the tribes may seem trivial, Martinez gave rise to a deeper flaw in implementation.  The 
Court found that ICRA, the only federal legislation which obligates tribes to protect 
individual human rights and fragmentarily reflects US international human rights 
obligations, permits no federal judicial review of tribal violations other than habeas 
corpus review for ongoing wrongful detention.59  An allegation of a tribal human rights 
violation must be resolved in tribal court, though ICRA does not require the creation of 
a formal court structure and tribal courts may find ICRA claims barred by the tribal 
sovereign immunity doctrine.60  Under federal law, tribal courts are technically bound to 
enforce ICRA’s provisions, but, since federal courts cannot review tribal court 
58
 Concluding Observations (n 29) [285] (HRC expressed concern ‘about conditions of detention of 
persons deprived of liberty in federal or state prisons’); HRC General Comment 21 clarifies that States 
bear responsibility for all prisons within their territory. UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (1992) 153.
59
 ICRA (n 25) s 1303.
60
 Commission Report (n 11) 63-67.
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decisions, no guarantee exists that the tribe will enforce ICRA, or by extension, US 
international human rights obligations.  This is the procedural gap in implementation: 
individuals have no domestic forum capable of enforcing certain human rights 
provisions guaranteed in the UN Conventions and American Declaration against the 
tribes.  
The Martinez Court also held that ICRA creates no private cause of action in 
federal courts for equitable (declaratory or injunctive) relief against tribal officials and 
refused to imply Congressional intent to create such an action.  It reasoned that to do so 
would undermine the authority of tribal courts and would be contrary to the 
Congressional intention to protect tribal self-government.  This decision stands in sharp 
contrast to the Court’s jurisprudence interpreting civil rights legislation against the 
states and federal government.61  In these contexts it regularly infers federal causes of 
action to promote enforcement of civil rights.  Yet in the tribal context, the tribes’ status 
as separate political communities and the national policy of tribal independence 
prevents implied causes of action.  The Court explained its reluctance to imply federal 
judicial review in this way: 
[W]e have … recognized that the tribes remain quasi-sovereign nations which, 
by government structure, culture, and source of sovereignty are in many ways 
foreign to the constitutional institutions of the Federal and [s]tate governments.62
The Martinez judgment also shows that juridical treatment of tribal laws 
inconsistent with international human rights obligations diverges from treatment of 
similarly situated state laws.  Where potential conflict arises between a state law and a 
61 Martinez (n 41) 61; 1678-79.
62
 ibid 71; 1683-84.
International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by American Indian Tribes 22
treaty, US courts interpret the state law as consistent with US international obligations.  
This mechanism prevents invocation of the constitution’s supremacy clause to declare 
state law invalid.  Even non-self-executing treaties, such as the human rights 
conventions, may supersede state law or policy.63  This mechanism fails in the tribal 
context because federal courts lack jurisdiction to review tribal laws which may conflict 
with US international human rights obligations.  
The US Court of Appeals case of Linneen v Gila River Indian Community 
exemplifies the lack of domestic tribunals with jurisdiction to adjudicate claims by 
those asserting tenable allegations of tribal human rights violations.  The non-Indian 
claimants alleged violations amounting to arbitrary detention and degrading treatment.64
Although the non-Indian claimants in Linneen happen to have been US nationals, 
foreign nationals could find themselves similarly mistreated by tribal law enforcement 
officials exercising, for example, the tribal right of exclusion or investigation, which 
could create an international dispute for reparations for injuries to aliens.  Claimants 
asserted, inter alia, false imprisonment and unreasonable search and seizure claims 
against the tribe and a tribal law enforcement officer.  They sought compensation under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which provides compensation for violations of 
constitutional rights caused by those acting under colour of law.  Yet the Linneen court 
dismissed the claims, because ICRA creates no federal cause of action and neither the 
US Constitution nor the Civil Rights Act applies to tribes.  Tribal sovereign immunity 
shielded the officer himself from claims for damages, and prevented the claimants 
63
 Restatement (n 22) s 115 comment e.
64 Linneen (n 38).
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bringing an action against the tribe or tribal officer in tribal court.  Clearly, the tribe’s 
failure to waive immunity denied the claimants an effective remedy.    
The expansive protection afforded tribal officials through the tribal sovereign 
immunity doctrine raises questions of the efficacy of the rule of law in tribal legal 
systems.65  The lacuna of coverage of international human rights law in this instance 
goes unremarked by legal commentators.  Professor Shelton, for example, asserts that 
the USSC: 
[H]as affirmed that the right of access to the courts ‘assures that no person will 
be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning 
violations of fundamental constitutional rights’, such as those recognized in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871.66
This conclusion is incorrect in situations of tribal human rights violations.  ICRA itself 
purports to protect individual human rights against tribal governments, but creates 
limited access to federal courts and questionable access to tribal courts.67  Tribal 
sovereign immunity prevents such access, and consequently violates the US 
international obligations to ensure the availability of effective remedies.68
2 Substantive Remedies
65
 Commission Report (n 11) 65.
66
 D Shelton Remedies in International Human Rights Law (OUP Oxford 2000) 66.
67
 The only exception is habeas corpus review for wrongful detention following exhaustion of tribal 
remedies.
68
 eg ICCPR (n 15) art 3(b).
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Questions about the lack of substantive domestic remedies have not been raised in 
respect of federal and state governments because common law and statutory 
mechanisms have been created to ensure that individuals alleging human rights 
violations against these governments have access to tribunals with power to fashion 
remedies.  It is generally assumed that these mechanisms permit judicial enforcement of 
human rights claims against all levels of government within the US, but this 
characterization neglects tribes as governmental entities capable of violating individual 
human rights.  
In respect of substantive remedies, compensation is appropriate for arbitrary 
deprivations of liberty such as that alleged in Linneen,69 where the factual situation 
resembled arbitrary detention cases in the HRC, the IACHR, and various international 
claims tribunals, which have found compensation to be the appropriate remedy.70  A US 
ICCPR declaration states that it: 
[U]nderstands the right to compensation … to require the provision of effective and 
enforceable mechanisms by which a victim of an unlawful arrest or detention or a 
miscarriage of justice may seek and, where justified, obtain compensation from 
either the responsible individual or the appropriate governmental entity.71
Even the USSC has recognized that compensation ‘against the offending party is a vital 
component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees’.72 The 
Court established the common law mechanism for provision of compensation where 
69
 Shelton (n 66) 118-20.
70
 The HRC has found that where a State violates articles 9 or 14 ICCPR it must compensate the victim 
and ‘undertake to investigate the facts, take appropriate actions, and bring to justice those found 
responsible for the violations’.  Shelton (n 66) 15-16, 118-20.
71
 Reservations (n 29) understanding 2.
72 Gomez v Toledo 446 US 635, 100 S Ct 1920 (1980) 639; 1923 quoted in Shelton (n 66) 67.
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federal officials violate individual rights in Bivens v Six Unknown Federal Agents.73
Bivens actions do not extend to state or tribal officers, but Congress statutorily enabled 
claims for compensation against state officials.74  Professor Shelton views this 
legislation as an extension of the compensation remedy to ‘other levels of 
government’.75  The legislation however does not extend to tribal officials.  US 
municipal law permits no claims for compensation against tribal law enforcement 
officers acting in an official capacity unless the tribe itself has abrogated tribal 
sovereign immunity.76
Unlike compensatory relief, equitable (declaratory and injunctive) remedies are 
generally available against governmental officials in the US to rectify ongoing or 
imminent governmental violations of individual rights.77  Under US law tribal sovereign 
immunity does not protect tribal officials from suit for equitable relief, but the USSC 
refused to find an implied federal cause of action for equitable relief against the tribe or 
tribal officers in ICRA.78
[U]nless and until Congress makes clear its intention to permit the additional 
intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication of such actions in a federal 
forum would represent, we are constrained to find that [ICRA] does not 
impliedly authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against either the 
tribe or its officers.79
73
 403 US 388, 91 S Ct 1999 (1971)
74
 Civil Rights Act of 1871 codified as amended at (2000) 42 USC s 1983.
75 Shelton (n 66) 67.
76
 Commission Report (n 11) 63.
77 Ex parte Young 209 US 123, 28 S Ct 441 (1908).
78 Martinez (n 41) 71-72; 1683-84.
79
 ibid.
International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by American Indian Tribes 26
Where tribal law does not waive tribal sovereign immunity, tribal courts can refuse to 
adjudicate claims for equitable relief.80   The US Commission on Civil Rights has 
articulated concern that: 
The barring of all suits against a tribal government without its consent, 
particularly suits for injunctive or equitable relief under a statute such as the 
ICRA providing rights against the tribal government, can leave the plaintiff with 
a feeling of frustration, and often leaves the victim without an impartial tribal 
forum in which to seek redress under the ICRA or the tribe’s own civil rights 
law.81
Not only does the plaintiff feel frustrated, the tribes violate the US international 
obligation to provide an effective remedy to those whose human rights they may have 
violated.  
Whilst federal remedies are generally unavailable, some tribes do enable their 
courts to fashion effective remedies.  In a claim brought by prisoners under ICRA’s 
cruel and unusual punishment clause, for instance, the Colville tribal court found 
official immunity for equitable relief waived and closed the tribal prison until 
improvements were made.82  Had tribal prison conditions been severe enough and tribal 
remedies unavailable, the prisoners may have successfully petitioned a federal court for 
the writ of habeas corpus, the sole federal remedy available for tribal human rights 
violations.  Congress gave federal courts jurisdiction to issue this ‘great writ of liberty’ 
80 Dubray (n 46); Garman v Fort Belknap Community Council 11 ILR 6017 (Ft Belknap Tribal Ct 1984) 
(fact that tribal legislative body had not waived tribal sovereign immunity ‘is an act of tribal self-
government that this court cannot ignore’) cited in Commission Report (n 11) 64-65.   
81
 ibid.
82 Re Colville Tribal Jail 13 ILR 6021 (Colville Ct Appeal 1986).  
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in ICRA.83  It permits a federal judge to protect individuals against arbitrary or 
wrongful confinement by an American Indian tribe.  
A federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus against tribal detention requires: 
exhaustion of tribal remedies; a severe restraint of individual liberty; and a violation of 
ICRA’s substantive provisions.  Exhaustion of tribal remedies typically entails an 
appeal to the tribe’s highest court.84  A severe restraint of liberty may include tribal 
action beyond actual physical detention of the claimant: the Poodry case permitted 
habeas review of a tribal decision to banish certain members for ‘treason’.  Subsequent 
cases, though, appear to have narrowed the scope of habeas review to situations where a 
claimant is in physical custody or awaiting criminal trial before a tribal court.85
Because the federal court must identify a violation of a substantive provision of ICRA 
before issuing a writ of habeas corpus,86 tribal violations of human rights omitted from 
ICRA, such as the indigent defendant’s right to criminal defence counsel, are not 
cognisable in federal court.87   The habeas corpus remedy thus confines federal court 
review of tribal human rights violations to tribal court or tribal law enforcement actions 
enumerated in ICRA and resulting in ongoing wrongful detention.
83
 ICRA (n 25) s 1303 (any person may test the ‘legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe’).
84 Selam v Warm Springs Tribal Correctional Facility 134 F 3d 948 (9th Cir 1998).
85 Shenandoah v US Department of the Interior 159 F 3d 708 (2nd Cir 1998); Alire v Jackson 65 F Supp 
2d 1124 (Dist Oregon 1999).
86 Red Elk v Silk 10 ILR 3110 (Dist Montana 1983).
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Individuals alleging human rights violations have a right to an effective remedy 
under international law binding on the US. 88  This right includes a procedural right of 
access to a competent tribunal with power to fashion a remedy and a substantive right to 
an effective remedy.89  Two problems arise with the domestic remedial regime: tribal 
sovereign immunity often precludes access to any tribunal, whether federal, state, or 
tribal; and where a tribal court has power to fashion a remedy, if it declines to do so or 
its remedy proves ineffective, US federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the tribal 
court decision.90  Municipal law leaves the provision of remedies to the tribes, yet it is 
the United States which may bear international responsibility where tribes violate 
individual rights and fail to provide effective remedies.    
E ATTRIBUTION OF TRIBAL VIOLATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES
1 Tribes as State Organs
‘Every internationally wrongful act entails international responsibility’.91  The US 
commits an internationally wrongful act, and its international responsibility is engaged, 
if tribal violations of international human rights obligations are attributable to it.  The 
88
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preceding sections demonstrate that the tribes may commit acts or omissions violative 
of the international human rights obligations of the US, the criterion for international 
wrongfulness, but to determine whether a tribal violation incurs US international 
responsibility requires an examination of the principles of attribution.92  The Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal has stated that ‘in order to attribute an act to the State it is necessary to 
identify with reasonable certainty the actors and their association with the State’.93
The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Articles on State Responsibility) identifies several 
principles of attribution that could be used to attribute tribal human rights violations to 
the US.  Article 4 reiterates the rule of customary international law that attributes to 
States the conduct of government organs regardless of their position in the State 
hierarchy or branch of government.  Characterization of tribes as State organs provides 
the most plausible method of attribution given the tribes’ municipal status as 
governmental entities and the unity of the State in international law.94
That the tribes’ legal systems and political institutions exist largely outside the 
US federal framework makes characterization of tribes as organs of the federal 
government conceptually difficult from the standpoint of US municipal law.  Tribes are 
not federated entities as their exemption from constitutional human rights norms 
illustrates.  US public law treats federally recognized tribes as separate political 
communities with autonomous governments invested with inherent powers and 
92
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93 Yeager v Islamic Republic of Iran 17 Iran-USCTR 92 (1987) 101-2.
94
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immunities.  Attribution of tribal human rights violations to the US, however, does not 
depend on the domestic characterization of tribal powers: reference to municipal law for 
the status of State organs is insufficient.95
The definition of a State organ is construed broadly in international law.  
Conduct of an entity exercising public functions, such as a tribal law enforcement 
agency, is normally attributed to the State even if municipal law regards the institution 
as autonomous or independent of the government.96   The expansive definition of State 
organs encompasses sub-State entities analogous to the tribes.  For instance, the Franco-
Italian Conciliation Commission in the Heirs of the Duc de Guise case attributed 
conduct of the autonomous region of Sicily to Italy, because the Italian state was 
responsible for implementation of its international obligations notwithstanding Sicily’s 
status in municipal law.97  The commentary to article 4 notes that all governments 
affirmed that ‘the State became responsible as a result of “[a]cts or omissions of bodies 
exercising public functions of a legislative or executive character”’ in preparation for 
the Conference on the Codification of International Law of 1930.98  It cites a long line 
of cases, beginning with Montijo, which articulate the principle that it is irrelevant for 
purposes of characterization of an entity as a State organ whether the entity in question 
is a federated entity or a specific autonomous area.99
95
 ibid [11].
96
 ibid ch II commentary [6].
97 Heirs of the Duc de Guise (France v Italy) 13 RIAA 150 (1950) 161 cited in Articles (n 91) art 4 
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For this reason it would be remarkable if an international tribunal considering 
the question of attribution of a tribal human rights violation to the US were to find the 
tribes not organs of the State.  After all, the US states—which are federated entities
unlike tribes—function autonomously in their fields of exclusive competence.  They 
exercise inherent governmental powers, as do the tribes, and the ICJ has attributed state 
conduct to the US when its federated entities exercise inherent powers, even where the 
national government lacks authority to compel compliance with its international 
obligations.100  Similarly, tribal conduct which breaches US international human rights 
obligations is attributable to the US, because governmental organs of any type, 
irrespective of their position within the State, are State organs for purposes of 
attribution.101
An international tribunal should have no difficulty extending the general 
principle that the State is responsible for the acts of autonomous regions to the tribes as 
distinct governmental entities within the US.  But could international law directly bind 
the tribes?  Professors Wouters and De Smet102 suggest the ICJ’s statement that ‘the 
Governor of Arizona is under the obligation to act in conformity with the international 
undertakings of the United States’103 means that international law obliges federated 
entities to comply with the federation’s international obligations.  They stretch the 
99
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101
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102
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court’s language to conclude that ‘federated entities themselves could under certain 
conditions be held to be directly internationally responsible for violations of 
international law.’104  If correct, the tribes are bound to act in conformity with US 
international human rights obligations, as a matter of international law.  This is unlikely, 
however, since neither the tribes nor the US states have international legal personality.  
It is a general principle that the statutory implementation and structuring of international 
human rights norms, and the specific protection of individuals against violations of 
these substantive rights, are primarily domestic concerns.105  The ICJ’s failure to revisit 
the responsibility of US states in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals106 indicates that 
while the US may bear responsibility for tribal human rights violations, it must also 
decide how best to prevent tribal and state violations.
2 Tribes as Entities Exercising Governmental Authority
The conduct of entities enabled by municipal law to perform public functions is also 
attributable to the State.107  If the tribes were not characterized as State organs for 
purposes of attribution, tribal human rights violations could still be attributed to the US 
under the principle articulated in article 5 of the Articles on State Responsibility.  This 
principle permits attribution of the conduct of a person or entity which is not a State 
104
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organ but which the law of the State empowers to exercise elements of governmental 
authority, provided the person or entity acts in that capacity in that instance.108  The 
commentary indicates that this rule of attribution has been applied mainly to para-statal 
entities and privatised government service providers.  The tribes’ authority to exercise a 
wide range of public functions in US municipal law justifies treatment as para-statal 
entities exercising governmental authority in place of federal or state organs. 
This category is a narrow one, but likely encompasses attribution of tribal 
human rights violations to the US.  Unlike the preceding principle on the attribution of 
the conduct of State organs, it requires analysis of municipal law.  The conduct to be 
attributed must be of a public nature and the entity must exercise such power under 
municipal law.  Although the source of tribal authority does not generally flow from the 
basic US law, the constitution, federal common law and legislation have long 
recognized tribes as entities empowered to assert governmental authority.  Tribal public 
functions include the provision of social services, law enforcement, prisons, and courts.  
Tribes can also privatise their public functions.  So, for example, the conduct of a 
privatised tribal prison official is attributable to the US because the official exercises 
governmental authority.  This authority is tribal rather than state or federal, but is 
attributable to the State because of its public nature. 
3 Tribes as Private Entities
108
 ibid.
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It appears the tribes, as governmental entities, satisfy the test for State organs under the 
international law of State responsibility.  Judge Canby, however, has proposed that 
recent USSC jurisprudence may articulate a theory of tribal powers as non-
governmental.109  A line of cases implicitly characterizes tribal jurisdiction over non-
members as though the jurisdiction derives from a status analogous to private 
associations or private landowners.110  Private clubs can regulate membership and 
landowners can establish rules for others on their land.  If accepted, this non-
governmental view of tribal powers could impact attribution, because international 
tribunals may look to municipal law for guidance in determining whether an entity 
operates as a private association or a State organ.111
Parallels can be drawn between tribal conduct and the conduct of cultural or 
religious communities such as the Amish.  The Amish govern themselves through 
customary laws, live in isolated communities without modern conveniences, speak their 
own language, and adhere to a strict religious creed.  It is possible for the Amish to 
breach members’ substantive rights under international law, such as the right to 
109
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education,112 or the right of minorities to partake in the cultural, religious, and linguistic 
life of the minority community.113
The Amish could not be classified as State organs or entities exercising 
governmental authority because they have no public functions or authority.  Their 
conduct is not generally attributable to the US unless it has acknowledged or adopted 
the conduct as its own.114  Unlike the Amish, the federally recognized tribes have 
separate legal personality under municipal law as governmental organizations and 
instrumentalities.  The US recognizes the tribes’ prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction over non-members for the purposes of civil adjudication and exclusion.  
The governmental nature of the tribes can be distinguished from private groups, for 
instance, in the case of trespass.  If a non-member, or expelled member, trespasses on 
Amish land state law enforcement officials remove the trespasser, and the Amish 
landowner may sue the trespasser in state court under state law.  However, if a non-
member trespasses on tribal land, tribal officials can remove the member, and the 
landowner may sue the trespasser in tribal court under tribal law.  The few decisions 
indicating a judicial view of the tribes as private associations cannot overcome the 
substantial precedent and current practice of the US treating tribes as governments.  The 
federal executive’s official policy requires treatment of tribes on a government-to-
government basis.115  Further, the USSC recently held that tribes retain inherent 
112
 American Declaration (n 18) art XII; Wisconsin v Yoder 406 US 205, 92 S Ct 1526 (1972) (Amish 
withdrawal of children from school constitutional).
113
 ICCPR (n 15) art 27.
114
 Articles (n 91) ch II commentary [2], arts 8, 11.
International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by American Indian Tribes 36
governmental powers over non-member Indian criminal defendants.116 It appears 
unlikely that an international tribunal would view tribes as governmental entities when 
exerting authority over Indians, but not when exerting authority over non-Indians.  This 
municipal recognition provides a basis for international treatment of tribes as State 
organs.
The unrecognized tribes, like the Amish, cannot be classified as State organs.  
Municipal law views them as non-governmental entities and they exercise no 
prescriptive or enforcement jurisdiction.  Whilst these tribes may retain residual 
governmental powers, they are generally characterized as private entities.   Of course, 
traditional tribal governments may continue to operate, but without US recognition they
are no different than private associations.  Although it is theoretically possible for an 
unrecognized tribe to violate a member’s right to access to minority culture, or to deny 
retained tribal treaty rights to individuals, these breaches are not generally attributable 
to the US.  
While purely private conduct cannot generally be attributed to a State,117 the US 
may be held internationally responsible for private conduct in particular circumstances.  
The human rights instruments require it to ensure the rights protected to all individuals 
within its territory.  It fails to meet this obligation if it allows private violations to occur 
without impunity or fear of retribution.  To ensure human rights protections States must 
115
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exercise due diligence to prevent private conduct which breaches an individual’s human 
rights and to investigate and punish such violations.118  A State’s omission, as a breach 
of its human rights obligations, must remain analytically distinct from attribution of 
private conduct, however.119  If State agents control, direct, or approve human rights 
violations committed by private actors, or decide to allow such violations to continue, 
the acts are attributable to the State.120  The commentary to Chapter II of the Articles on 
State Responsibility notes that the different rules of attribution have a ‘cumulative 
effect’ so that a State may be held internationally responsible for the effects of a private 
entity’s conduct.  If the US fails to take necessary measures to prevent such effects,121 it 
faces the possibility of international responsibility for human rights violations by the 
Amish, unrecognized tribes, or other private entities or actors.  If it knew, for example, 
that an unrecognized tribe had arbitrarily detained and mistreated an individual, but 
permitted the detention to continue, the tribal conduct would then be attributed to it.122
4 Tribal Agents Exceeding Authority
A tribal agent may incur US international responsibility for conduct that violates an 
individual’s human rights even if the agent acts outside his or her sphere of authority or 
118 Velásquez Rodríguez (Honduras) IACtHR Series C no 4 (1988) [170].
119
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violates tribal or federal law.123  In Linneen,124 the non-Indian claimants asserted that a 
uniformed tribal law enforcement officer arbitrarily detained them for three to four 
hours, pointed his gun at their heads, threatened to seize their property and kill their 
animals, and told them immediately to accept Jesus Christ as their saviour, because he 
was going to kill them and dispose their bodies in the wilderness.  Such action by a 
tribal official violates international prohibitions on arbitrary detention, and, possibly, 
provisions on cruel or inhuman treatment.  Tribal sovereign immunity shielded the 
officer and tribe from suit in tribal and federal court because he was acting in his 
official capacity at the time.  Although such arbitrary detention and mistreatment goes 
beyond the tribal officer’s legitimate powers, this does not affect attribution.125
The Caire claim demonstrates that such ultra vires actions by tribal public 
officials are attributable to the US.  In Caire, the tribunal held that the conduct of public 
officers, even if they act outside their competence, involves the responsibility of the 
State if the officials act under cover of their status and use means ‘placed at their 
disposal on account of that status’.126  Whether a tribal official acts in his or her official 
capacity depends on whether the officer was ‘cloaked with governmental authority’.127
Tribal police, wardens, and other tribal officials, operate as public officials within tribal 
territory.  The rules of attribution make conduct of such governmental officials 
123 Rodríguez (n 118) [170].
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125
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attributable to the State, even if such conduct exceeds the officials’ authority under 
tribal or federal law.128
F POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL REMEDIAL MECHANISMS
The US has not accepted the individual petition mechanisms which enable the UN 
human rights monitoring bodies (the HRC, the Committee Against Torture (CAT), and 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)) to consider 
individual complaints, to reach views on the merits, and to recommend remedies.129
Thus, an individual deprived of his or her due process rights or tortured by an American 
Indian tribe could not bring a petition before the HRC or the CAT.  However, it is 
possible for the monitoring bodies to address alleged tribal violations of US human 
rights obligations through the State reporting, inquiry, and inter-State complaint 
procedures (though the inter-State complaint mechanisms have never been used).130
Until the US withdrawal from the VCCR Optional Protocol on compulsory jurisdiction 
takes effect,131 the ICJ would also have jurisdiction over disputes if a tribal government 
128
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were to violate a foreign national’s right to consular notification.132  Alternatively, if a 
tribe interferes with the substantive rights of a foreign national, the injured state may 
seek redress through international dispute resolution mechanisms and diplomatic 
pressure.
The regional inter-American human rights regime allows injured individuals or 
groups to petition the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).  This 
mechanism extends to violations of the American Declaration, a source of international 
obligations binding on all Organization of American States (OAS) member States, and 
therefore permits petitions against the US, which is not a state party to the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).  The US has objected to the American 
Declaration’s binding character.133  Nevertheless, the IACHR has several times asserted 
authority to declare the US in breach of its international obligations under the 
Declaration and to make recommendations on remedial measures.134  The IACHR has 
also declared the US responsible for violations of rules of customary international law 
and jus cogens norms relative to human rights.135  If the US fails to comply with 
IACHR recommendations, the Commission may ratify and publicize its report and 
submit it to the OAS General Assembly.  It continues evaluating measures adopted in 
respect of its recommendations until compliance is achieved.136
132 LaGrand (n 40); Avena (n 106).
133 Garza v Lappin 253 F 3d 918 (7th Cir 2001) 924-25 cert denied 533 US 924 (2001); Juan Raúl Garza 
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Exactly which rights individuals possess under this regional system is a matter 
of some controversy.  The revised OAS Charter refers to ‘fundamental rights’ eight 
times, but does not define the phrase.137  The IACHR has interpreted it to mean the 
American Declaration principles read ‘in light of’ current international law,138 which 
extends its reach beyond the Declaration principles themselves.  This method has 
implications for the study of potential tribal violations because it allows the IACHR to 
declare responsibility for international obligations beyond those espoused in the 
Declaration.  For instance, the IACHR has interpreted the Declaration in light of article 
27 ICCPR on individual rights to partake in minority culture, which the tribes are in a 
unique legal position to violate through tribal laws defining membership and the quasi-
criminal punishment of tribal banishment.  The IACHR has relied on this ICCPR 
provision to ground violations of American Declaration protections including the right 
to life, liberty, and personal security (article I); the right to residence and movement 
(article VIII); and the right to the preservation of health and to well being (article XI).139
The IACHR has also based violations of the Declaration’s right to a fair trial and due 
136
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process of law provisions (articles XVIII and XXVI) on US obligations to foreign 
nationals and their states under the VCCR.140
The IACHR’s individual petition mechanism provides one avenue for those 
alleging human rights violations by the US to pursue a claim before an international 
tribunal.  The exhaustion of domestic remedies rule applies to IACHR petitions, but 
tribal sovereign immunity may prevent any tribal or federal remedy.  Tribal courts may 
or may not have jurisdiction over the claim depending on whether the particular tribe 
limits immunity from human rights claims.  Of course, even if the tribal court fashions a 
remedy it may prove ineffective, and permit a challenge at the inter-American level.  
Tribal sovereign immunity prevents an appeal to federal court, except in cases of 
ongoing physical custody.  This situation permits an injured individual in most human 
rights cases to overcome the exhaustion of domestic remedies hurdle by exhausting 
whatever tribal remedies are made available.  Appeals to federal courts should not be 
required as they generally lack jurisdiction to review human rights claims against the 
tribes.
In the recent Dann case the Commission found the US responsible for violations 
of international law related to its wrongful taking of Western Shoshone tribal lands.  In 
particular it concluded that the US failed to ensure the Danns’ American Declaration 
rights to a fair trial, to property, and to equality before the law.  The Commission 
recommended that the US provide the petitioners with an effective remedy, including 
adoption of legislative or other measures to ensure respect for their right to property.  It 
140 Ramón Martinez Villareal (US) (Merits) IACHR Case 11.753 Report no 52/02 (2002); César Fiero 
(US) (Merits) IACHR Case 11.331 Report no 99/03 (2003).
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further recommended that the US ensure the property rights of indigenous persons are 
determined in accordance with the rights established in the American Declaration.141
The case marked the first instance of an international human rights body finding the US 
responsible for violating human rights specific to an indigenous people.  Tribes have 
heralded Dann as a model for future complaints against the US to promote tribal 
interests.  What they may not yet recognize is that the IACHR individual petition 
mechanism also permits the Commission to consider claims against the US for human 
rights violations by the tribes themselves.  
A case such as Linneen, where a tribal official allegedly arbitrarily detained and 
mistreated individuals provides an ideal candidate.  If it, or a similar case, comes before 
the IACHR and a tribe has in fact violated individual human rights binding on the US, 
the Commission can attribute such conduct to the US and declare it responsible for the 
tribal violation and, additionally, for lack of an effective remedy in the tribal or federal 
legal systems.  The IACHR would likely recommend compensation and provision of an 
effective remedy, and evaluate implementation of its recommendations.  Tribal human 
rights violations may arise in other contexts as well.  The Linneen claimants were US 
nationals, but foreign nationals could similarly find themselves subject to mistreatment 
by a tribal officer potentially creating an international dispute for mistreatment of 
aliens.
Although no international monitoring body has yet investigated human rights 
violations by tribal governments, the US Commission for Civil Rights has 
recommended that Congress establish extensive ICRA-reporting procedures to monitor 
141 Dann (n 1) [173].
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the need for future amendments.  Under its proposal the tribes must annually report the 
disposition of all ICRA claims including the alleged violation, the tribal forum in which 
the complaint was filed, the potential for appeal, and the types of remedies available.142
The reports would enable Congress to monitor the ‘success or shortcomings’ of the 
Indian judicial systems, but Congress has not yet enacted such a reporting scheme.  
President Clinton also established a body whose mandate included a review of tribal 
human rights violations, but it has not issued any reports or recommendations.143
G CONCLUSION
US federal and state law largely reflects its international human rights obligations and 
enables the federal and state judiciaries to fashion appropriate remedies where 
individual rights are violated.  The map of American human rights law, however, 
contains substantive lacunae in legislative implementation against the American Indian 
tribes, which have authority to engage in conduct that may constitute a breach of an 
international human rights obligation of the US.  Whilst the US represents to the HRC 
that  ‘[t]he Constitution greatly restricts the ability of the government at all levels to 
infringe on the liberty of its citizens,’144 this is simply untrue in respect of tribal 
governments, which are not bound by the constitutional protections.  Procedural gaps 
142
 Commission Report (n 11) 72-74.
143
 Executive Order 13107 ‘Implementation of Human Rights Treaties’ (1998) 63 FR 68991.
144
 HRC ‘Initial reports of States parties due in 1993: US’ UN Doc CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (1994) [203].
International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by American Indian Tribes 45
also exist.  Although the federal Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 superficially reflects 
certain US international human rights obligations, most remedies for violations of the 
Act are only available in tribal courts.  Further, these tribal courts may deny claimants 
access on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity.  
Tribal violations of US international human rights obligations are attributable to 
the US because the tribes are governmental entities within municipal law, and as such 
fall under the rubric of State organs.   The US, therefore, commits an internationally 
wrongful act whenever tribal conduct breaches an individual’s substantive rights 
protected by international law and binding upon the US.  Thus, the US can be held 
internationally responsible for tribal acts it does not control and for which its judiciary 
cannot fashion a remedy.  
The disjuncture between US international human rights commitments and its 
domestic implementation against tribes must be rectified: it is bound to adopt measures 
to give effect to its international human rights obligations.  No domestic legal obstacles 
exist to federal legislation implementing international human rights obligations against 
the tribes, because Congress retains plenary legislative power over them.145  To correct 
the gaps identified in legislative implementation, ICRA must be revised to reflect fully 
international human rights instruments binding on the US.  Furthermore, to protect the 
US from international responsibility, Congress should explicitly limit tribal sovereign 
immunity in cases where individuals allege human rights violations, and give federal 
courts the power to review tribal court decisions implicating substantive individual 
145 Martinez (n 41) 72; 1684.
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rights.  The federal courts should also be given power to fashion remedies, including 
compensation, for tribal human rights violations.  
If the tribes wish to avoid further federal intrusion upon their independence, they 
should incorporate US international human rights obligations into the tribal legal system 
and carefully comply with the rights protected.  This would require waiving tribal 
sovereign immunity for suits against tribal officials alleged to have violated human 
rights, and enabling tribal courts to develop appropriate remedies for such violations, 
including compensation.  Otherwise, a case like Linneen will eventually find its way to 
an international monitoring body and the US will be declared responsible for the tribal 
conduct.  Such a decision would create intense domestic pressure for restrictions on 
tribal independence and self-government.  Indications are that some tribes have 
recognized the dilemma.  The proposed Blackfoot Nation Constitution, for example, 
incorporates international human rights protections.146  Other tribes, such as the Colville 
Confederated Tribes, have incorporated international law as a source of law in its tribal 
code.147
These developments should be encouraging for those who desire greater tribal 
independence, but, unless the tribes remain vigilant and provide effective remedies for 
alleged human rights violations, the potential exists for more intrusive federal 
restrictions and oversight.
146
 (2004) arts 5(2), 8 cited in T Helton ‘Nation Building in Indian Country: The Blackfoot Constitutional 
Review’ (2003) 8 KJLPP 1.
147 Colville Confederated Tribes v Seymour 23 ILR 6008 (Colville Ct App 1995).
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